New Stalking Legislation Will Not Fix the Failure to Use Existing Powers

The introduction of new stalking legislation is a positive development. However, the key issue is whether these changes will lead to improvements in professional practice.

Recent changes to stalking legislation have been presented as strengthening the protection available to victims. This assessment is accurate.

The Crime and Policing Act 2026 extends the circumstances in which Stalking Protection Orders can be made. Courts will be able to impose an SPO following conviction or acquittal without waiting for a separate police application. The Act also makes explicit that the civil standard of proof applies to SPO proceedings and provides powers for statutory multi-agency guidance and police guidance concerning the disclosure of identifying information about stalkers.

These developments represent positive steps forward. However, it is important to distinguish between measures that strengthen an existing framework and powers that are genuinely new.

Stalking Protection Orders have been available in England and Wales since January 2020. They were introduced to enable early police intervention before stalking behaviour becomes entrenched or escalates. The police do not need to wait for a criminal charge or conviction before applying, and an order can include both prohibitions and positive requirements intended to address the perpetrator’s behaviour.

The police have not had to wait until the criminal investigation has concluded. They have not had to establish the offence of stalking beyond reasonable doubt before seeking an order. They have not been restricted to using an SPO only after criminal proceedings have begun. The recent legislation therefore strengthens the route, removes uncertainty and fills some procedural gaps.

It does not invent early intervention through Stalking Protection Orders.

That framework was already there.

The main challenge has not solely been a lack of statutory powers.

I spent more than 28 years in policing and remain proud of that service. I know that many officers take stalking seriously and work hard to protect victims while managing heavy workloads, competing risks, complex evidence and difficult decisions.

This is not about blaming individual investigators or suggesting that every poor outcome results from indifference or incompetence. It is about whether the professional system as a whole enables stalking to be recognised early, investigated properly and managed consistently.

I was delivering stalking investigation training to police forces before SPOs came into force. I have also trained professionals from other agencies, led a national stalking service and worked directly with many stalking victims. I continue to deliver stalking training now.

My work as an independent Domestic Homicide Review and Domestic Abuse Related Death Review Chair and Author has provided another perspective. Following a death, reviews often have to reconstruct a history that was previously divided between agencies, recording systems and individual incidents. Information may have existed, and professionals may have responded to the particular matter before them, but the wider pattern, cumulative harm, and changing risk were not always recognised.

Across these different roles, I have repeatedly seen the same central difficulty. Stalking is too often managed within systems that record and respond to individual incidents.

A malicious message may be recorded as a communications offence. Damage to a vehicle may be treated solely as criminal damage. An unwanted appearance at the victim’s workplace may be dealt with separately. Contact in breach of an order may be recorded only as a breach. Reports made on different dates, to different officers or across different agencies may not be connected.

Each individual event may have been recorded correctly. The failure occurs when the response ends there, and the overarching pattern of stalking remains hidden.

Stalking should be understood as a pattern of behaviour rather than a series of isolated incidents.

The significance of stalking behaviour often lies in its repetition, context and connection with other conduct. A bunch of flowers may appear harmless. It is not harmless when it forms part of persistent unwanted contact intended to demonstrate that the perpetrator can still reach the victim.

Standing in a public place may be lawful. Repeated appearances near the victim’s home, workplace or children’s school may have an entirely different meaning.

Viewing a social-media account may not, by itself, amount to an offence. It becomes more significant when the information is used to track the victim, contact other people, create new identities or demonstrate knowledge of the victim’s movements.

Breaking a car mirror is criminal damage. It may also form part of a wider stalking course of conduct intended to intimidate, punish or show continued access to the victim.

The presenting offence matters. But it does not necessarily explain the behaviour as a whole.

Professionals need to look beyond the latest incident and ask:

What has this person been doing?

How long has it been happening?

What connects the behaviours?

How have the methods changed?

What appears to be driving the conduct?

What is the perpetrator trying to achieve?

What does the behaviour communicate to the victim?

Where is it heading?

Stalking cannot be understood simply by counting incidents. It requires examination of the perpetrator’s persistence, fixation, grievance, entitlement and continuing efforts to maintain an unwanted presence in the victim’s life.

Previous behaviour continues to be relevant.

A stalking investigation should not begin at the date of the latest report. Earlier conduct may be essential to understanding the current behaviour and risk. This includes incidents previously reported to the police, matters recorded under different classifications, allegations that resulted in no further action and information held by other agencies. It may also include conduct that the victim did not initially recognise as stalking or did not report at the time.

An earlier incident does not become irrelevant because it was recorded as harassment, malicious communications, criminal damage, antisocial behaviour or breach of an order. Nor does it become irrelevant because it was previously investigated or dealt with.

That does not mean previously prosecuted conduct can simply be prosecuted again. Evidential admissibility, previous proceedings, relevant time limits and fairness must all be considered properly. It does mean that the history should not be discarded.

Previous behaviour may reveal persistence after clear rejection, changes in tactics, repeated circumvention of blocks or orders, movement from digital contact to physical proximity, increasing anger or entitlement, the use of third parties, surveillance, information gathering or a failure to be deterred by police and court intervention.

My experience of undertaking DHRs and DARDRs has reinforced this point. Following a death, a review may place messages, damage, unwanted appearances, third-party contact, complaints, surveillance and breaches into a single chronology. Only then may the persistence, changing methods and direction of the behaviour become clear.

The issue is not always that professionals did nothing. It is often that the significance of what was known was not understood collectively. A case cannot be properly understood if every new report is treated as a fresh starting point.

It is necessary to actively construct the full course of conduct.

Victims rarely arrive with a complete evidential chronology. They may report the latest incident because it was the final straw. They may describe what frightened them most rather than everything that has happened. Some conduct may have become so routine that they no longer think to mention it. Others may omit behaviour because it was dismissed previously.

A victim may have been told that no offence occurred because a message was not threatening, the perpetrator remained on a public road, or an unwanted delivery appeared innocuous. They may therefore assume that similar behaviour is not worth reporting.

Professionals need to explore the wider history without making the victim feel disbelieved or interrogated. That may include asking about direct, indirect and attempted contact; physical and digital surveillance; repeated appearances at significant locations; approaches to relatives, friends, colleagues and new partners; gifts and deliveries; aliases and new accounts; impersonation; malicious allegations; property interference; access to devices and location information; or complaints and litigation used to maintain contact.

The purpose is not simply to compile a longer list. It is to establish how the behaviours connect and what they mean when considered together.

Responsibility for constructing that course of conduct should not be placed entirely upon the victim. Victims should not be expected to investigate their own cases, repeatedly expose themselves to distressing material or monitor the perpetrator on behalf of the authorities.

A breach of an order should not be treated as a substitute for addressing the underlying stalking behaviour.

The same principle applies where the latest behaviour breaches bail, a restraining order, an SPO or another protective measure. A breach is an offence in its own right. But it may also continue the course of conduct of stalking. A charge of breaching a restraining order alleges that the perpetrator disobeyed a court order. It does not necessarily describe what the perpetrator has continued to do to the victim.

A criminal damage charge records damage caused to property. It may not show that the damage formed part of continuing surveillance, intimidation or unwanted intrusion.

A communications offence may address the content or method of one particular message. It may fail to reflect repeated attempts to contact the victim through new accounts, different telephone numbers, friends, relatives or professional channels.

Where the evidence supports it, both the individual offence and the wider stalking should be considered. That is not unnecessary duplication. The associated offence identifies the immediate act. The stalking offence identifies the continuing course of conduct and the perpetrator's actions toward the victim over time.

Without that context, the criminal justice record may appear to be a series of apparently unconnected offences. Persistence is obscured, the victim’s experience is fragmented and future professionals may fail to recognise the trajectory.

Escalation in stalking cases does not always involve physical violence.

Stalking risk is often misunderstood because escalation is judged mainly by whether the perpetrator has become physically violent. Violence and explicit threats plainly matter. They are not the only indicators of increasing risk. Escalation may involve contact becoming more frequent, the perpetrator appearing closer to the victim, movement from online monitoring to physical surveillance, greater use of aliases or third parties, contact spreading to the victim’s family or workplace, or more time and resources being devoted to the behaviour.

It may also involve intrusion into places previously regarded as safe, acquisition of information the perpetrator should not possess, increasing anger or grievance, repeated breaches, or decreasing concern about being identified or arrested.

A perpetrator who continues after arrest, warning, bail conditions or the making of a court order may be demonstrating more than persistence. They may be showing that formal intervention has not deterred them.

The absence of an explicit threat should not be treated as the absence of a threatening message.

Persistence, surveillance and demonstrated access may communicate:

“I know where you are.”

“I can reach you.”

“You cannot exclude me from your life.”

“I will continue regardless of what you or the authorities do.”

The victim may understand that message immediately. Professionals who focus only on the literal wording of individual communications may not.

The actions taken by the victim in response to stalking also constitute important evidence.

The seriousness of stalking cannot be assessed solely by looking at what the perpetrator has done. Professionals must also understand what the victim has been forced to do in response.

A victim may change their telephone number, route to work, locks, social habits, employment or children’s arrangements. They may stop exercising outdoors, avoid particular shops, sleep elsewhere, close social-media accounts or repeatedly check outside before leaving home. They may experience disturbed sleep, poor concentration, hypervigilance, anxiety or a constant need to anticipate where the perpetrator might appear next.

These are not peripheral details. They demonstrate how the perpetrator’s conduct has restricted the victim’s freedom and altered their daily life.

Professionals must also avoid rigid assumptions about what fear looks like. A frightened victim may appear calm, angry, organised or defiant. They may respond to messages or retain limited contact because of children, propety, employment or safety concerns. None of that establishes an absence of fear.

Asking only, “Are you frightened?” is rarely sufficient. Better questions explore what the victim has changed, where they no longer go, what they now do before leaving home, how their sleep or work has been affected and what they believe the perpetrator may do next. Disruption to the victim’s life often provides clearer evidence than a simple yes-or-no answer about fear.

Stalking Protection Orders should be tailored to address the specific behaviours identified in each case.

Stalking Protection Orders can be important early-intervention tools. Their existence alone does not create safety. An order prohibiting direct contact may be inadequate where the perpetrator uses aliases, third parties, gifts, online publication, workplace complaints, surveillance or other indirect methods.

Conditions must reflect the actual pattern. Professionals need to understand when an SPO should be considered, what evidence supports an application, how prohibitions should address the identified behaviour and when positive requirements may be appropriate.

The statutory guidance makes clear that an SPO can include restrictions on direct or third-party contact, entering particular locations, referring to the victim online and using vexatious court proceedings. It can also include positive requirements where these are necessary to protect the victim. Professionals must also consider how the order will be monitored, how breaches will be investigated and how it will operate alongside the continuing criminal investigation.

An SPO should not become a substitute for investigation. Nor should the making of an order create false reassurance. A breach may provide important evidence about persistence, fixation and the perpetrator’s disregard for boundaries or formal authority. The response must therefore address both the breach and the wider stalking behaviour where the evidence supports that approach.

Legislation alone cannot substitute for professional judgement.

The independent review of stalking legislation has examined whether stalking is sufficiently defined, whether stalking and harassment can be distinguished more clearly, whether their interaction provides a coherent framework, and whether the law adequately addresses stalking facilitated by new and emerging technology. The review was required to submit its report and any recommendations to the Home Secretary by the end of March 2026. The report has not yet been published. Importantly, the operation of Stalking Protection Orders was outside the formal scope of that review, although the reviewer was required to consider how any proposed changes to stalking law might affect them. These are legitimate areas for examination.

There is no single, exhaustive statutory definition of stalking. The Protection from Harassment Act provides a non-exhaustive list of conduct associated with stalking, but the offence remains closely linked to the legal framework for harassment. However, no statutory definition will identify every stalking case automatically. No legislative amendment will, by itself, connect reports made to different officers, retrieve relevant intelligence, recognise the meaning of an apparently harmless gift or understand why repeated appearances in public places cause a victim to fear what may happen next.

The law provides the framework.

Professionals still have to recognise the behaviour and exercise judgement.

Training should extend beyond a basic explanation of the law.

Effective stalking training cannot be limited to explaining sections 2A and 4A of the Protection from Harassment Act or listing the powers available under the Stalking Protection Act.

Professionals must understand the legislation. But knowing that an offence or order exists is not the same as being able to recognise when it applies.

Training should enable practitioners to identify the wider course of conduct, connect previous and current behaviour, recognise escalation, understand the victim's fear and disruption, and gather evidence that demonstrates the totality of the offending. It should address how perpetrators use direct and indirect contact, physical and digital surveillance, third parties, gifts, complaints, litigation, property damage, aliases and apparently legitimate processes to remain present in the victim’s life.

It must show professionals how to build an evidence-led case rather than placing almost the entire responsibility for the investigation on the victim. It should cover the proper use of previous reports, intelligence, digital evidence, witnesses, agency information and material concerning other victims where relevant and lawful. It must also explain how and when an SPO should be considered, how meaningful conditions should be drafted and how the order should operate alongside the investigation rather than replace it.

The purpose of training is not merely to improve legal knowledge. It is to change professional practice.

Responsibility for effective practice should not rest solely with frontline practitioners.

Training is often concentrated on frontline staff. That is not enough. A capable officer or practitioner can identify stalking and still be undermined by fragmented allocation, weak recording, incomplete information sharing, poor supervision or a later decision that strips away the course of conduct.

DHRs and DARDRs repeatedly demonstrate that professional responses are shaped by systems as well as individuals.

Recording categories determine how information can be found. Allocation decisions affect whether one investigator sees the full history. Supervisors influence whether earlier reports are retrieved and risk is reassessed. Managers determine whether staff receive specialist training, have sufficient time and are held accountable for the quality of their decisions. Partner agencies may hold pieces of information that change the meaning of what the police or another service already knows.

No individual practitioner should be expected to compensate for every weakness within that system.

Supervisors must understand what good stalking practice looks like. They should test whether the full history has been obtained, previous reports identified, incidents connected and escalation considered. They should examine whether victim disruption has been properly evidenced, whether digital and third-party lines of enquiry are being pursued and whether the proposed offences reflect the totality of the behaviour. They should also scrutinise whether an SPO was considered at the right stage and whether any decision not to apply is properly reasoned.

Senior leaders need to distinguish between recorded activity and effective practice. Counting completed risk assessments, individual arrests or detections will not establish whether an organisation is recognising stalking properly or protecting victims effectively.

The CPS Stalking Action Plan 2026–2030 itself acknowledges the need for improvement in the quality and consistency of prosecution responses. It includes new prosecutor training, updated guidance, stronger victim-focused approaches and greater cross-agency collaboration. The College of Policing is also consulting on new authorised professional practice intended to replace three separate advice documents with formal, role-specific guidance based on a victim-centred, suspect-focused and context-led approach. These developments are welcome. They also confirm that consistency, professional understanding and joined-up practice remain unresolved issues.

The critical measure will be whether these changes improve professional practice.

Recent legislation strengthens the SPO framework. It allows courts to make orders in additional circumstances, confirms the applicable standard of proof and provides a statutory basis for clearer multi-agency and disclosure guidance.

Those changes matter. But they do not create the principle of early intervention through Stalking Protection Orders. That power has existed since 2020. Nor do they replace the fundamentals of stalking investigation.

Stalking must be recognised as a pattern rather than a collection of incidents.

Previous behaviour and intelligence must be considered.

The course of conduct must be actively constructed.

The investigation must remain focused on the perpetrator’s behaviour.

Risk must be reassessed as the conduct and circumstances change.

Victim fear and disruption must be properly explored and evidenced.

Protective action should not wait until a prosecution appears certain.

Orders must reflect the perpetrator’s actual methods.

Breaches must be treated as part of the wider behaviour where the evidence supports that conclusion.

These messages are familiar. The continuing problem is not simply an absence of legislation or written guidance. It is about whether professionals recognise the behaviour, understand its significance, and have the confidence, leadership, operational support, and supervision to respond properly.

There is also a legitimate question about whether the practical tools used by investigators have kept pace with the law. It is not enough for accurate information to exist somewhere within national guidance. It must be reflected in the documents, processes and supervisory prompts that professionals actually use.

I will return to one specific example of that in a separate article.

For now, the central point is straightforward.

The legislation has been strengthened.

The route to protection has been widened.

Some uncertainty has been removed.

But legislation alone will not prevent stalking from being divided into separate incidents or ensure that existing powers are understood and used effectively. That requires competent training, professional curiosity, coherent guidance, effective supervision, leadership and accountability across the system.

The law may have changed.

The real test is whether practice does.

About the author

John Trott is an independent stalking and domestic abuse specialist, former Detective Chief Inspector and former force lead for domestic abuse, stalking HBA and FGM. He was delivering stalking investigation training to police forces before the introduction of Stalking Protection Orders and continues to train police officers and professionals from other agencies. He is a former CEO of a national stalking service, has worked directly with many stalking victims and undertakes independent DHR and DARDR Chair and Author work.

Sources and further reading

Home Office, Crime and Policing Act 2026: stalking factsheet.

Home Office, Stalking Protection Orders: statutory guidance for the police.

Home Office, Stalking legislation review: terms of reference.

Crown Prosecution Service, CPS Stalking Action Plan 2026–2030.

College of Policing, Stalking or harassment: have your say, consultation on revised authorised professional practice.

 © 2026 John Trott, AbuseFreeLife. All rights reserved.