Stalking Protection Orders have existed since 2020. Why does the national investigation checklist still not mention them?

In my previous article, I argued that recent changes to stalking legislation are welcome, but legislation alone will not improve professional practice. Stalking Protection Orders already gave the police an early-intervention power. The more difficult question is whether that power is properly recognised, understood and embedded within the systems and practical tools used by investigators.

The Joint NPCC and CPS Checklist for Use by Police Forces and CPS in Cases of Harassment or Stalking is a clear example of the problem. It remains available through the College of Policing stalking guidance but is dated July 2018, meaning it predates both the Stalking Protection Act 2019 and the introduction of Stalking Protection Orders in January 2020.

Its age is not, in itself, the problem. Much of the document remains relevant. It asks officers to consider the wider pattern of behaviour, the cumulative impact, and context rather than focusing only on the latest incident. It also prompts consideration of risk assessments, victim statements, emergency calls, body-worn video, digital material, police records and information held by other agencies.

The concern is more specific. An operational document intended to guide the preparation of stalking cases has not been updated to include the principal stalking-specific protective order introduced since it was written.

Why the checklist is important

This is not simply an older document retained for background reading. The checklist tells officers to complete every box and submit it to the CPS whenever charging advice or a charging decision is sought. It describes itself as an important part of the evidential file and states that it should be completed fully and accurately.

It also contains specific prompts about protective measures. Officers are asked about previous civil orders and breaches, including DVPNs, DVPOs, Police Information Notices and court bail. The checklist separately asks whether the victim wants a restraining order and what terms to seek. Bail conditions and locations to avoid are also addressed.

The checklist also refers to Police Information Notices, despite their use having been criticised in the 2017 Living in Fear inspection and subsequently withdrawn across policing. By 2020, PINs had ceased to be used by all forces. Their continued inclusion in a national checklist, while Stalking Protection Orders are omitted entirely, further demonstrates how far the document has fallen behind current practice.

Yet there is no reference to Stalking Protection Orders. The checklist does not ask whether an SPO or interim SPO has been considered, require the officer to record why an application has or has not been pursued, or prompt consideration of what prohibitions or positive requirements may be needed. It says nothing about how an order would sit alongside the criminal investigation, who would manage it, how compliance would be monitored or how a breach should be addressed.

That is a significant omission from a document intended to support the investigation and preparation of stalking cases.

Why the omission is significant

Stalking Protection Orders came into force on 20th January 2020. They were introduced to fill a gap in the protective-order framework by allowing the police to intervene before the evidential threshold for criminal proceedings had been met. They can be considered before an investigation begins, while it is underway, where prosecution is not pursued or alongside criminal proceedings. Interim orders are also available while the full application is awaiting determination.

An SPO is therefore not something that should first be considered once a case is ready for the CPS. Its purpose includes protecting the victim while the wider behaviour is still being investigated.

A checklist used in stalking cases should require investigators to consider that power and record the decision. At present, it does not.

National scrutiny has already identified inconsistent use

The omission is more concerning because problems with the use of SPOs have already been identified nationally.

The Home Office review of Stalking Protection Orders, published in 2023, found that the orders were generally regarded as useful and capable of reducing risk. Their use, however, varied considerably between forces. The review also identified slow, bureaucratic application processes, inconsistent implementation, limited use of positive requirements, and, in some areas, a preference for prosecution rather than pursuing an SPO.

The later investigation into the stalking super-complaint submitted by the Suzy Lamplugh Trust on behalf of the National Stalking Consortium reached similarly important conclusions. The joint investigation by the IOPC, HMICFRS and College of Policing found that significant change was required and specifically recommended that SPOs be made simpler and easier for police to use.

The IOPC’s supporting review examined 50 stalking cases and found very limited evidence of protective orders being used, particularly SPOs. Only one case contained evidence that officers had considered an SPO, although the review properly acknowledged that some of the cases predated the introduction of SPOs. It also identified recurring problems with stalking not being recognised, incidents being treated separately, poor risk assessment and weak risk management.

That evidence makes the absence of an SPO prompt in the joint checklist harder to understand. Where national scrutiny has already found that a protective power is being considered and used inconsistently, the operational documents given to investigators should reinforce that power rather than omit it.

The independent legal review is separate

The independent stalking legislation review led by Richard Wright KC followed the recommendation arising from the super-complaint investigation that the law on stalking should be reconsidered. Its purpose was to examine whether the criminal law sufficiently defines stalking, whether stalking and harassment can be distinguished more clearly, whether the interaction between those offences creates a coherent framework and whether the legislation adequately addresses stalking facilitated by new and emerging technology.

The operation of Stalking Protection Orders was expressly outside the scope of that review, although the reviewer was required to consider how any proposed legislative changes might affect them. The final report and any recommendations were due to be submitted to the Home Secretary by the end of March 2026, but the report has not yet been published.

That distinction is important because the case for updating the checklist does not depend on the outcome of the Wright review. Evidence that SPOs have been inconsistently understood, considered and used is already available through the Home Office review and the super-complaint investigation. No further legal review is needed before the checklist can be brought up to date.

The information exists, but it is fragmented

It would be wrong to suggest that no guidance is available on Stalking Protection Orders. The Home Office has published statutory guidance explaining when SPOs may be used, how they interact with criminal proceedings, the availability of interim orders and the use of both prohibitions and positive requirements. The College of Policing also provides separate SPO material through its stalking guidance.

The problem is not the complete absence of information. It is that the information has not been incorporated into the joint checklist officers are directed to use when preparing stalking cases for the CPS.

An investigator can complete every section of that checklist and submit the case for charging advice without being required to record whether an SPO has been considered. To address the issue properly, the officer must already know that the checklist is incomplete, locate the separate guidance and bring the different documents together.

That is not a sensible basis for consistent practice. It also creates an uncomfortable contradiction. Officers are expected to identify stalking by connecting information spread across incidents, agencies and systems, yet the national guidance intended to support them requires a similar exercise.

Checklists do not replace judgement, but they influence decisions

No checklist can replace knowledge, investigative curiosity or professional judgement. Adding an SPO question would not guarantee that an appropriate application followed, that the proposed conditions reflected the perpetrator’s behaviour or that the order was effectively managed. Operational checklists still influence practice. They shape what officers consider, what they record, what supervisors review and what prosecutors expect to receive.

A clear prompt creates a decision point by requiring the investigator to consider the issue and explain the outcome. Where that prompt is absent, the issue is easier to overlook and less likely to receive meaningful scrutiny.

At the very least, the checklist should ask:

Has a Stalking Protection Order or interim Stalking Protection Order been considered?

That question should be supported by prompts about when the decision was made, what risk assessment informed it, the victim’s views, whether specialist stalking advice was obtained and the reasons for applying or not applying. The purpose is not to create another box that can be ticked without thought. It is to make the decision visible, reasoned and capable of review by supervisors and prosecutors.

What should the revised checklist contain?

The current checklist should be reviewed jointly by the College of Policing, NPCC and CPS. It should require officers to record whether an SPO or interim SPO has been considered and, if so, at what stage; the risk assessment informing the decision; the victim’s views; and any involvement from a specialist stalking advocate.

It should also address the prohibitions and positive requirements being considered; the rationale for not pursuing an application; how the order will operate alongside the criminal investigation; who will manage and monitor it; and how breaches and any continuing stalking will be investigated.

The wording is important. A question asking only whether an SPO was “considered” risks becoming a routine tick-box exercise. The officer should be required to show how the decision was reached and why the proposed response is necessary and proportionate.

The checklist should also make clear what scrutiny is expected from supervisors and prosecutors. National scrutiny has already shown that positive supervisory intervention can improve risk assessment in stalking cases. It has also shown what can happen when risk management and protective action remain weak.

This is not about blaming individual officers

I spent more than 28 years in policing and remain proud of that service. I know that many officers take stalking seriously and work under considerable pressure while managing heavy workloads, competing risks and increasingly complex digital evidence.

This is not an argument that every failure to pursue an SPO is the fault of an individual investigator. It is about whether the wider professional system provides officers with clear, current and coherent tools.

Resource pressures make that support more important, not less. An overstretched investigator should not have to navigate several separate documents to establish the current national position. Supervisors and prosecutors should also have a consistent basis for examining whether early protective action has been considered.

The College of Policing, NPCC and CPS each have a role in making sure that the operational material used by investigators reflects the law, statutory guidance and learning already identified through national scrutiny. A checklist produced in 2018 cannot fully do that in relation to a protective order introduced in 2020.

The wider point

My previous article argued that legislation alone will not resolve the recurring weaknesses in the response to stalking. The checklist illustrates why.

The power exists, the guidance exists, and national reviews have already identified inconsistent consideration and use of SPOs. Yet a central joint police and CPS operational document still does not mention them.

That does not mean officers do not care about stalking. It does not mean that no force is using SPOs effectively, nor does it invalidate the useful material already contained within the checklist. It does show that national expectations and national operational tools are not properly aligned.

Investigators need clear, current guidance. Supervisors and prosecutors need a consistent basis for scrutiny. Above all, victims should not have to depend on whether an individual practitioner already knows that the checklist in front of them is incomplete.

Stalking Protection Orders have existed since January 2020. The joint NPCC and CPS stalking checklist should reflect that. It should have been updated before now and needs to be updated without further delay.

About the author

John Trott is an independent stalking and domestic abuse specialist, former Detective Chief Inspector and former force lead for domestic abuse, stalking HBA and FGM. He was delivering stalking investigation training to police forces before the introduction of Stalking Protection Orders and continues to train police officers and professionals from other agencies. He is a former CEO of a national stalking service, has worked directly with many stalking victims and undertakes independent DHR and DARDR Chair and Author work.

Sources and further reading

Home Office, Review of Stalking Protection Orders.

Home Office, Stalking legislation review: terms of reference.

IOPC, HMICFRS and College of Policing, Police response to reports of stalking: super-complaint investigation.

IOPC, Review of IOPC cases involving stalking.

Joint NPCC and CPS, Checklist for Use by Police Forces and CPS in Cases of Harassment or Stalking, July 2018.

© 2026 John Trott, AbuseFreeLife. All rights reserved.